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Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
l-po.9 
Re: Fashion Place Investment, Ltd, v. 
No. 870553-CA 
Salt Lake County 
Dear Clerk: 
As attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants ("Plaintiffs") 
in this matter, we received a copy of a letter dated March 10, 
1989 to you from the attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
("Defendant"). 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Rules of the Court, we 
are submitting an original and five copies of this letter in 
response to that letter in order to demonstrate why the Court's 
decision in Toshiko Pickover, et al. v. Smith's Management 
Corporation, Civil No. 880193-CA, does not support Defendant's 
position in this matter. 
Contrary to Defendant's statement in paragraph three of 
its letter, the Pickover decision does not support Defendant's 
argument that Plaintiffs' agreement to provide fire insurance for 
Defendant's personal property precludes Safeco Insurance Company, 
Plaintiffs' insurer, from filing a subrogation action against 
Defendant. The Court in Pickover did not have before it for 
BULLIVANT, HOUSER, BAILEY, PENDERGRASS & HOFFMAN 
Clerk 
March 16, 1989 
Page 2 
consideration the primary issue in this matter: whether under 
the terms of the lease agreement between Fashion Place Associates 
and Defendant, the agreement to provide insurance expressly or 
impliedly exempts Defendant from liability for its own negligence 
by elevating Defendant to the status of an implied coinsured, 
thereby barring a subrogation action by Plaintiffs' insurer. In 
Pickover (at page 9), the Court simply held that the rule of 
strict construction would not necessarily apply to agreements to 
purchase insurance for another's benefit. 
If the limited holding in Pickover does apply to this 
matter, it is relevant only to the construction of the lease 
agreement provision regarding procurement of insurance. 
Appellants' Brief p. 4 and App-3. The strict construction rule 
should still apply to the interpretation of the lease agreement 
as a whole because the lease was prepared by Defendant, and any 
ambiguous provisions should be construed against the drafter of 
the lease. Appellants' Brief, pp. 24-26. The strict 
construction rule should particularly apply to Paragraphs 7, 16 
and 19 of the lease because, in addition to being inserted by 
Defendant, those provisions do not deal with the procurement of 
insurance. Appellants' Brief, pp. 4, 5, 21-24 and App-3, 5, 6. 
In Defendant's March 10, 1989 letter, Defendant refers 
to the cases of Koennecke v. Waxwinq Cedar Products, Ltd., 543 
P2d 669 (Or 1975), and Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord 
Mechanical Con., 406 P2d 556 (Or 1965). Plaintiffs' position 
regarding the inapplicability of those two cases is set forth in 
Appellants' Brief at pages 33-34 and in Appellants' Reply Brief 
at pages 6-7. 
Significantly, in the Pickover decision, the Court 
noted at page 9, footnote 4, that the lack ^>f explicit language 
clearly indicating an intent to provide coverage for a party's 
own negligence may leave open a factual question of whether such 
coverage was intended. That language supports Plaintiffs' 
position that the granting of Summary Judgment in this matter was 
inappropriate because there is a material issue of fact as to the 
parties' intent. Appellants' Brief, p. 24. 
BULL1VANT, HOUSER, BAILEY, PENDERGRASS & HOFFMAN 
Clerk 
March 16, 1989 
Page 3 
Because the Court is hearing the oral argument of this 
matter on March 21, 1989, Plaintiffs request that this letter be 
brought to the immediate attention of the Court. A copy of this 
letter has been sent to opposing counsel. 
Very truly yours, 
Theodore E. Kanell 
John N. Braithwaite 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
I. Franklin Hunsaker 
Dianne K. Ericsson 
BULLIVANT, HOUSER, BAILEY, 
PENDERGRASS & HOFFMAN 
I. Franklin Hunsaker 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
IFH/jd 
cc: Gary B. Ferguson 
Gary L. Johnson 
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APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This appeal by Plaintiffs-Appellants ("Plaintiffs") is 
from a Judgment following the granting of a Summary Judgment in 
favor of Defendant-Respondent Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County 
Mental Health ("Defendant"). 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to the Order dated December 3, 1987 of the Utah Supreme Court 
and also pursuant to Utah Code Ann- § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1987). The 
Judgment appealed from is final and appealable as certified 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure-
Plaintiffs timely filed their Notice of Appeal within 3 0 days 
of the date of the entry of the Judgmentj 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR DECISION ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that, absent an 
express provision in the lease to the contrary, Defendant (the 
tenant and lessee) is a coinsured of Plaintiffs (the lessor), 
thereby barring a subrogation action by plaintiffs7 insurer 
(Safeco Insurance Company ["Safeco"]), particularly where the 
trial court (albeit another judge) had previously and correctly 
ruled that there are material issues of fact concerning the 
I 
meaning of provisions in the lease agreement ("the lease") 
drafted by Defendant's attorney regarding the liability for 
loss by fire caused by Defendant's own negligence? 
2 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling as a matter of 
law that the lease did not contain an express provision 
reserving Safeco's right of subrogation and in ruling that two 
particular paragraphs in the lease constituted pre-loss 
releases of Safeco's subrogation rights? 
3. Did the trial court err in dismissing all of the 
subrogation claims where some of those claims were brought by 
virtue of insurance policies issued to other tenants who were 
not parties to the lease? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Action 
This action involves various claims against Defendant 
for damages resulting from a fire that destroyed the Fashion 
Place Professional Building ("the Building") . Included is a 
claim that Defendant's negligent use of an electric space 
heater and an extension cord caused the fire- [Clerk's Record 
Index ("CR") I486, 1492-93] 
Plaintiffs either had an ownership interest in the 
Building or were tenants in the Building at the time of the 
fire, Safeco insured, under various separate insurance 
policies, Plaintiffs' interests in the Building and Plaintiffs' 
interests in personal property located in the Building. Some 
of the claims are subrogated claims by Safeco, brought in 
Plaintiffs' names, to recover sums paid Plaintiffs for damage 
3 
to their real and personal property and for business 
interruption losses. In addition to Safebo's subrogated 
claims, Plaintiffs also make claim for uninsured losses. 
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that it was an implied coinsured under the Safeco insurance 
policy and that all subrogation claims under all Safeco 
insurance policies should be dismissed because Defendant was an 
implied coinsured under the Building policy. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The trial court (Judge Judith M. Billings) denied 
Defendant's first Motion for Summary Judgment in a Memorandum 
Opinion dated January 14, 1987. (CR 3735, 3924; App-8) 
However, the trial court (Judge David S. Young) subsequently 
granted Defendant's renewed Motion for Summary Judgment in an 
Order dated September 24, 1987 (CR 4110; App-29), and a 
Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant on the same date (CR 
4114; App-33) . Plaintiffs appeal from tl>at Judgment. 
C. Statement of Facts 
In 1978, Defendant entered into a lease agreement with 
Plaintiff Fashion Place Associates, the owner of the Building. 
Fashion Place Associates is a general partnership composed of 
four dentists — Robert Anderson, Barlow Packer, Orlando 
Borrows and Carlson Terry. (App-10; CR 1485) 
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In 1981, Doug Kettle (Director of Administrative 
Services for Defendant Salt Lake County Mental Health) and Jon 
Gilbert (Defendant's Assistant Director of Administrative 
Services), on behalf of Defendant, entered into negotiations 
with Plaintiff Fashion Place Associates to renew the existing 
lease. Doctors Anderson and Packer represented Fashion Place 
Associates in the lease negotiations. (CR 3997, 4003, 4467 
pp 10-11) Attorney Patricia Marlowe of Defendant's County 
Attorney's Office prepared and was the sole author of that 
renewed lease. The lease was approved by Marlowe and Don 
Sawaya, the chief deputy of the Civil Division of Defendant's 
County Attorney's office. (CR 4492 pp 7, 50, 77) 
The lease provided in pertinent part: 
"7. At the expiration of the term of 
this lease, LESSEE will yield and deliver up 
the PREMISES to LESSOR in as good order and 
condition as when the same were entered upon 
by the LESSEE, reasonable use and wear 
thereof, damage by fire and casualty not the 
fault of LESSEE and damage by elements 
excepted therefrom. 
* * * * * * 
"9. Responsibility for utilities, 
taxes, and insurance shall be as indicated: 
"Power (L), Heat (L), Water (L), Sewer 
(L), Telephone (T), Real Property 
1/ The 1981 Lease Agreement drafted by Defendant and executed 
by the parties is included in its entirety in the Appendix to 
this Brief. (App-1) 
5 
Tax (L), Increase in Real Property Tax 
(L), Fire Insurance on Building (L), 
Fire Insurance on Personal property 
(L), Glass Insurance (L). 
"16.(a) LESSEE shall indemnify and 
save LESSOR harmless from all loss, damage, 
liability, or expense incurred by LESSOR due 
to the exclusive negligent acts or omissions 
to act of LESSEE, its officers, employees, 
or agents arising out of LESSEE'S use or 
operation of the PREMISES and shall not 
permit any lien or other claim or demand to 
be enforced against the PREMISES by reason 
of LESSEE'S use of the PREMISES." 
(CR 2, Ex. "A" pp 3, 5; App-3, 5; emphasis in original) 
Safeco insured Plaintiff Fashion Place Investment, 
Ltd., which had purchased the Building from Plaintiff Fashion 
Place Associates prior to the fire. In addition, Safeco 
insured, under separate individual policies, several tenants in 
the Building. Those tenants were not parties to the lease with 
Defendant. (CR 2494-96, 2724-26, 3899; App-10) 
Following a fire that destroyed the Building, Safeco, 
pursuant to its obligations under the insurance policy issued 
to Fashion Place Investment, Ltd. and pursuant to its 
obligations under the separate individual! policies issued to 
the tenants, paid substantial sums to rebuild the Building and 
to compensate the owners and tenants for personal property 
losses and business interruption losses. Safeco, acting as 
subrogee of the owners and tenants, then instituted this action 
in the names of its insureds. In addition to Safeco's 
6 
subrogated claims, Plaintiffs also are making claims against 
Defendant for uninsured losses. (CR 3899; App-10, 25) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Defendant was not an implied coinsured. 
The trial court erred in ruling that, absent an 
express provision in the lease to the contrary, a lessee 
(Defendant) is presumed to be a coinsured of the lessor 
(Plaintiffs), thereby barring a subrogation action by the 
lessor's insurer. That ruling is contrary to a large body of 
established law and sound public policy which opposes the 
contracting away of liability for future negligent acts. 
Consistent with that public policy, a lease provision requiring 
the lessor to provide fire insurance does not by itself 
expressly or impliedly exempt the lessee from liability for its 
own negligence by elevating the lessee to the status of an 
implied coinsured under the landlord's insurance policy. 
In any event, Paragraphs 7 and 16 of the lease drafted 
by Defendant's attorney establish that Defendant is liable for 
loss by fire caused by its own negligence. Even if those lease 
provisions are somehow ambiguous, they should be construed 
against Defendant, or, in the alternative, any such ambiguity 
must be resolved by determining the intent of the parties. As 
the trial court initially and correctly ruled, that material 
issue of fact precluded the granting of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
7 
2. There was no pre-loss release of subrogation 
rights. 
The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that the lease did not contain an express provision reserving 
Safeco's right of subrogation against Defendant and in ruling 
that two paragraphs in the lease constituted pre-loss releases 
of Safeco's subrogation rights. Neither a provision in the 
lease requiring the lessor (Plaintiffs) to procure fire 
insurance nor a standard, boilerplate provision that all 
provisions in the lease inure to the benefit of the parties was 
intended or should be construed as a matter of law as an 
agreement by the lessor (Plaintiffs) to release the 
tenant/lessee (Defendant) from liability for its own 
negligence, particularly where the evidence of the parties7 
intent shows otherwise. 
3. In any event, all of the subrogation claims 
should not have been dismissed. 
The trial court erred in dismissing all subrogation 
claims under all Safeco policies, some of which were issued to 
tenants who were not parties to the lease covering Defendant. 
Even if Defendant is found to have been an implied coinsured 
under Safeco's insurance policy issued to Plaintiffs, Safeco 
should not be precluded from bringing subrogation actions 
against Defendant based on policies issued to tenants who were 
not parties to the lease covering Defendant. 
8 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
The trial court erred in ruling that, absent 
an express provision in the lease to the 
contrary, a lessee is presumed to be a 
coinsured of the lessor, thereby barring a 
subrogation action by the lessor's insurer. 
The lease provision requiring Plaintiffs, as 
lessor, to provide fire insurance did not 
expressly or impliedly exempt Defendant, as 
lessee, from liability for its own 
negligence by elevating Defendant to the 
status of an implied coinsured under the 
insurance policy and did not bar a 
subrogation action by Plaintiffs' insurer. 
The erroneous ruling by the trial court that Defendant 
is a coinsured under the Safeco insurance policy presents a 
threshold and overriding issue in this appeal and one of first 
impression in Utah. 
There are three reasons, each of which will be 
discussed below, why the trial court's ruling is incorrect and 
should be reversed: 
1. The coinsured ruling is contrary to a large body 
of established law and sound public policy that a party to a 
lease should not be immunized from liability for its own 
negligence in the absence of a clear and unequivocal 
contractual provision in the lease to that effect. 
2. Two paragraphs of the lease drafted by 
Defendant's attorney establish that Defendant is liable for 
loss by fire caused by its own negligence. Paragraph 7, the 
9 
so-called "redelivery" provision, required Defendant, at the 
expiration of the lease, to return the leased premises in the 
same condition as when the lease was entered into and it 
contained an express exception for "damage by fire and casualty 
not the fault of LESSEE," (Emphasis added) Paragraph 16, the 
"indemnity" provision, required Defendant to indemnify and save 
the lessor (Plaintiffs) harmless from al^ loss, damage, 
liability or expense incurred by the lessor (Plaintiffs) due to 
the negligent acts of the lessee (Defendant). 
3• Even if the lease was somehow ambiguous as to 
whether Defendant is liable for loss by fire caused by its own 
negligence, any ambiguity should be construed against Defendant 
as the drafter of the lease. Alternatively, and as the trial 
court initially and correctly ruled, there is a material issue 
of fact as to the parties, intent which precluded the granting 
of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A. The trial court7s coinsured ruling is contrary to 
a large body of established law and sounfl public policy. 
The crucial threshold issue in this case — one of 
first impression in Utah — is whether a tenant/lessee 
(Defendant) may immunize itself against liability for its own 
negligence merely by inserting a provision in a lease that it 
drafted requiring the lessor (Plaintiffs) to carrv fire 
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insurance. The trial court's initial ruling^/ that, "absent 
an express provision in the lease to the contrary, the 
presumption is that the lessee is a coinsured of the lessor, 
thus barring a subrogation action by the insurer against its 
own insured" (App-19) is contrary to Utah law that disfavors a 
party contracting to protect itself against liability for loss 
caused by its own negligence. See Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 220, 341 P2d 944, 947 
(1959) : 
"Assuming that in the absence of some 
consideration of public policy militating 
against it, one may contract to protect 
himself against liability for loss caused by 
his negligence, it is nevertheless well 
settled that contracts in which a party 
attempts to do so are subject to strict 
construction against him; and further, that 
he will be afforded no protection unless the 
preclusion against negligence is clearly and 
unequivocally stated." (Footnote omitted) 
2/ The initial trial court ruling by Judge Billings was on 
Defendant's first Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge Billings 
denied Defendant's Motion on the basis that there was a 
material issue of fact whether the parties to the lease 
contracted around the presumption that the Defendant is a 
coinsured. Judge Billings ruled that the lease provisions are 
ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence as to the parties' 
intentions had to be considered. (App-19-2 0) Judge Young, 
however, erroneously granted Defendant's second Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the basis of the coinsured presumption and 
also on the basis that undisputed material facts establish that 
there was no express intent by the parties to reserve Safeco's 
right to subrogate against Defendant. (App-25-27) 
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Accord Union Pacific Railroad Co, v. El Paso, 17 Utah 2d 255, 
259, 408 P2d 910 (1965): 
"[T]he law does not look with favor upon one 
exacting a covenant to relieve himself of 
the basic duty which the law imposes on 
everyone: that of using due care for the 
safety of himself and others. * * * [T]he 
presumption is against any such intention, 
and it is not achieved by inference or 
implication from general language such as 
was employed here. It will be regarded as a 
binding contractual obligation o^ ily when 
that intention is clearly and unequivocally 
expressed." [Footnotes omitted] 
The court in Union Pacific Railroad also noted that, as in this 
matter, the contract had been prepared by the party seeking to 
be immunized from liability and, therefore, the contract should 
be strictly construed against that party. 
A number of courts in other jurisdictions are in 
accord with Utah in a reluctance to immunize a party from 
liability for its own negligence. One such case — Winkler v. 
Appalachian Amusement Co., 79 SE2d 185 (NC 1953) — involved a 
fact situation very similar to this matter. A theater owner 
brought an action against the tenant to recover 
3/ For additional cases applying a doctrine of strict 
construction against parties attempting to limit liability 
caused by their own negligence, see Howe Rents Corp. v. 
Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 420 P2d 848 (1966); Barrus v. 
Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P2d 207 (1965); Kidman v. White, 
14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P2d 898 (1963); Cornwall v. Willow Creek 
Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P2d 928 (1962); Jensen7s Used 
Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 273, 323 P2d 259 ;i958) ; and Jankele v. 
Texas, 88 Utah 325, 54 P2d 425 (1936). 
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damages resulting from a fire in the theater caused by the 
tenant's negligent operation of a popcorn popper. Just as the 
lease in this matter, the lease in Winkler required the lessor 
to fully insure the building. However, that lease was even 
more generous to the tenant than the lease in this matter. 
Rather than the redelivery provision in the lease excepting 
only "fire and casualty not the fault of lessee," the lease in 
Winkler required only that the tenant redeliver the premises at 
the end of the lease in as good order, repair and condition as 
at the commencement of the lease, "ordinary wear and tear 
excepted, and damage by fire or other casualty excepted." 
79 SE2d at 188. The court in Winkler ruled that neither the 
redelivery provision nor the insurance provision relieved the 
tenant from liability for damage by fire caused by the tenant's 
negligence: 
"Contracts for exemption from liability 
for negligence are not favored by the law, 
and are strictly construed against the party 
asserting it. The contract will never be so 
interpreted in the absence of clear and 
explicit words that such was the intent of 
the parties." 
79 SE2d at 190. 
Sears, Roebuck And Company v. Poling, 81 NW2d 462 
(Iowa 1957), like this matter, involved a lease drawn by the 
party (Sears) seeking immunity from its own negligence. Sears 
pointed to the lease's redelivery provision requiring return of 
the premises in substantially as good condition as received, 
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"loss by fire, tornado, earthquake or any unavoidable casualty 
and ordinary wear and tear excepted." 81 NW2d at 466. Sears 
also relied on the lease provision requiring the landlord to 
fully insure the premises in contending tjiat Sears was relieved 
of any liability for its own negligence in causing the fire. 
The court in Sears first noted that the lease should be 
construed most strongly against the party who prepared it. The 
court rejected Sears7 immunity argument on the basis that the 
lease agreement did not clearly express the intention of the 
parties to relieve Sears from liability for its own 
negligence: 
"Certainly if the parties intended to 
relieve the lessee from such a liability it 
is reasonable to expect Sears would have 
found more apt language to express that 
intent than this lease contains." 
81 NW2d at 466. 
Likewise, in Galante v. Hathaway Bakeries, Inc., 176 
NYS2d 87, 6 AD2d 142 (NYAD 1958), the court held that a 
contract will not be construed to indemnify a person against 
his own negligence unless such intention is expressed in 
unequivocal language: 
"We recognize * * * that iii some of the 
decisions where the tenant has peen 
exonerated, it appears, at least[ 
inferentially, that an insuranc^ company, as 
subrogee, was attempting to recover from the 
tenant the amount of a loss paid to a 
landlord. We see no valid reason to strive 
to reach such a conclusion in the light of 
the established legal principled heretofore 
discussed." 
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176 NYS2d at 94. 
Finally, in Poslosky v. Firestone Tire And Rubber 
Company, 349 SW2d 847 (Mo. 1961), the landlord brought an 
action against Firestone, the tenant, for damages sustained as 
the result of Firestone's negligence in causing a fire on the 
leased premises. Firestone, which had drafted the lease, 
contended that the insurance provision that required the lessor 
to provide property insurance exempted it from liability for 
its own negligence in causing the fire. The court rejected 
that argument: 
"[A]ny possible idea that the parties meant 
more than they said and impliedly meant that 
lessors could look only to the insurance 
proceeds to satisfy the tort liability of 
lessee for its negligence in causing fire 
damage, is entirely untenable when it is 
recognized that the lease,s language in 
question was Firestone's language; it was 
part of a printed lease furnished by 
Firestone and, by reasonable inference, 
prepared and used by it in leasing property 
in various states. It is reasonable to 
suppose that so important a provision as one 
exonerating Firestone from liability for 
fire damage caused by its negligence as 
lessee or providing that lessors would 'look 
solely to the insurance companies for 
compensation of their damage,' would have 
been inserted in the lease in clear and 
unmistakable language, if such matter had 
been a subject which it intended to cover in 
the lease." 
349 SW2d at 850. 
While the issue of whether a lease provision requiring 
one party to provide insurance absolves the other party from 
liability for its own negligence is one of first impression in 
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Utah, the Supreme Court has indicated how it would rule on this 
issue. In DuBois v. Nye, 584 P2d 823 (Utah 1978), the insurer 
of sellers of a house brought an action against the purchasers 
to recover for fire damage to the house caused by the 
purchasers7 negligence. The purchasers defended based on the 
following provision in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase Agreement: 
"All risk of loss and destruction of 
property, and expenses of insurance shall be 
borne by the seller until date of possession • 
at which time property taxes, rents, 
insurance, interest and other expenses of 
the property shall be prorated as of date of 
possession." 
584 P2d at 824. The purchasers contended that they were 
immunized from liability for their own negligence because they 
were not in possession and did not bear the risk of loss, and 
also because the sellers had been reimbursed by their insurance 
carrier. The Court rejected those arguments: 
"[The parties] could not have intended to 
absolve each other for losses caused by 
negligence or by willful destruction. Nor 
does it matter that an insurance policy was, 
or was not, in force and effect that covered 
loss by fire. 
"In this case the plaintiff did have 
insurance coverage, and it is tHe insurance 
company which is bringing this action in the 
name of the seller, seeking to recover from 
the tortfeasor the amount it paid under its 
policy for the loss. Therefore^ if recovery 
is had by the plaintiffs, they will be 
subrogated to the insurance company who bore 
the loss; and the liability for the damages 
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caused will be upon the defendants whose 
negligence caused the loss. 
"The defendants cannot avoid liability 
on the ground that the damage had been paid 
for by the insurance company. The 
collateral source rule provides that a 
wrongdoer is not entitled to have damages, 
for which he is liable, reduced by proof 
that the plaintiff has received or will 
receive compensation or indemnity for the 
loss from an independent collateral 
source." 
584 P2d at 825 (footnote omitted). 
It is clear from the DuBois decision and the decisions 
in Walker Bank & Trust Co., supra, and Union Pacific Railroad 
Co. v. El Paso, supra, that Utah frowns upon immunizing a party 
from liability for its own negligence in the absence of a clear 
and unequivocal contractual provision to that effect. 
Moreover, the Court in DuBois impliedly ruled that a provision 
requiring a landlord/lessor to carry insurance does not 
immunize a tenant/lessee from liability for its own 
negligence. Therefore, this Court should rule in this matter 
that a party to a lease (Defendant) may not immunize itself 
against liability for its own negligence merely by inserting a 
provision in a lease that it drafted requiring the other party 
to carry fire insurance. 
The primary case upon which the trial court in this 
matter erroneously relied is Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska 
Commun., 623 P2d 1216 (Alaska 1981). In that case, the 
landlord and RCA, the tenant, entered into a one-year 
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commercial lease for a warehouse. RCA agreed to redeliver the 
premises at the expiration of the lease in as good a condition 
as at the start of the lease, "excepting fair wear and tear 
and/or loss or damage caused by fire, explosion, earthquake or 
other casualty; provided that such casualty was not caused by 
the negligent act of Lessee, its employees or agents * * *." 
623 P2d at 1218. In addition, RCA agreed to indemnify and hold 
the landlord harmless from loss, damage and liability arising 
from RCA's negligence. The lease required the landlord to 
obtain a fire insurance policy. After a fire damaged the 
building, the landlord's insurer paid the loss and commenced a 
subrogation action against RCA on the basis that RCA had 
negligently caused the fire. Like Defendant in this matter, 
RCA argued that it was immune from liability for its own 
negligence because it was an implied coinsured under the 
insurance policy. 
The court in Alaska Ins. held that RCA was an implied 
coinsured of the landlord: 
"[I]f the landlord in a commercial lease 
covenants to maintain fire insurance on the 
leased premises, and the lease does not 
otherwise clearly establish the tenant's 
liability for fire loss caused by its own 
negligence, by reserving to the landlord's 
insurer the right to subrogate against the 
tenant, the tenant is, for the limited 
purpose of defeating the insurer's 
subrogation claim, an implied coinsured of 
its landlord." 
623 P2d at 1220. 
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It is significant that the court in Alaska Ins. 
reached its decision by ignoring the crucial language found in 
the redelivery provision in the RCA lease which is similar to 
the same provision in the lease in this matter: "provided that 
such casualty was not caused by the negligent act of the 
Lessee, its employees or agents." Id. at 1218. Instead, the 
court merely stated that it believed "that in a situation of 
this type it would be undesirable as a matter of public policy 
to permit the risk of loss from a fire negligently caused by a 
tenant tc> fall upon the tenant rather than the landlord's 
insurer." Id. at 1219 (footnote omitted). 
The only "public policy" identified by the court in 
Alaska Ins. was a potential reduction of litigation if casualty 
insurers were precluded from seeking to recoup payments from 
negligent tortfeasors. The court did not bother to address why 
a casualty insurer should be treated differently from any other 
insurer that pays an insured claim and subrogates against the 
negligent tortfeasor. The court also did not address the 
countervailing public policy that a negligent party should not 
be able to immunize itself from liability for its torts absent 
an express unequivocal provision. Finally, the court did not 
address why it was good public policy for an innocent insurer 
of an innocent landlord to bear the loss while the tortfeasor 
escapes liability. 
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The dissenting opinion in Alaska Ins. by the Chief 
Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court is instructive to this 
matter in that it is consistent with strong public policy and 
therefore commends itself to this Court: 
"[H]ere the parties chose to include an 
express provision establishing the tenant's 
liability for fires caused by thje tenant's 
own negligence. The majority cites no 
opinions in which the court has held that 
the general principle overrules such an 
express provision, and I would not allow it 
to do so here. In my opinion, the public 
policy considerations involved here are not 
so overwhelming that the parties ought not 
to be allowed to contract for a different 
result according to their own preferences; 
but the majority's treatment of the language 
here makes this well-nigh impossible. 4/ 
"I do not read the provisions of the 
lease as being inconsistent. However, even 
4/ In a footnote to his dissent, Chief Jfustice Rabinowitz 
stated: 
"I think that there are two cle^r provisions 
establishing the tenant's liability for loss from fires 
started by its own negligence: Paragraph 11(c), which 
states, '[l]essee agrees to indemnify and hold lessor 
harmless from and against loss, damage and liability 
arising from the negligent act of lessee, its agents, 
employees or clients;7 and Paragraph 11(b), which requires 
the lessee to 'leave said premises at the expiration of 
this lease in as good a condition as received, excepting 
fair wear and tear and/or loss or damage caused by fire, 
explosion, earthquake or other casualty; provided that such 
casualty was not caused by the negligent act of the Lessee, 
its employees or agents . . . .' Ii) my opinion, the 
lessee by these provisions clearly arid unambiguously 
covenanted to be responsible for fir^ damage caused by its 
own negligence." 
623 P2d at 1220 n.l. 
20 
if they were, I agree with the Rizzuto [v. 
Morris, 592 P2d 688 (Wash App 1979)] court 
in its statement that '[o]ur review of the 
cases in this area leads us to conclude that 
the intent of the parties is the primary 
factor considered by the courts in 
construing exemption clauses. ' * * * The 
instant case is on appeal from a summary 
judgment, and I think there are still 
genuine issues of material fact regarding 
the intent of the parties." 
623 P2d at 1220. Chief Justice Rabinowitz's well-reasoned 
dissent is particularly instructive to this matter because this 
matter, like the Alaska Ins. case, was decided by summary 
judgment, and the Chief Justice concluded, as the trial court 
initially and correctly did in this matter, that genuine issues 
of material fact regarding the intent of the parties precluded 
a summary judgment for the lessee/tenant. 
Courts of this state have ruled that public policy 
opposes the contracting away of liability for future negligent 
acts unless such intentions are clearly and unequivocally 
expressed. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El Paso, supra. 
Further, the Supreme Court has implied that an agreement to 
procure insurance is not sufficient to excuse a party from 
liability for its own negligence. DuBois v. Nye, supra. To do 
as the trial court did and adopt the Alaska Ins. rule that a 
lease provision requiring the landlord to provide insurance 
exempts a negligent lessee from liability would be a drastic 
departure from previously established Utah law. 
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The Alaska Ins. decision itself is a drastic departure 
from the earlier cases upon which it relies.5/ It ignored 
the large body of law that a landlord's agreement to provide 
fire insurance does not elevate the lessee to the status of 
coinsured under the lessor's policy and dbes not relieve the 
lessee from liability for its own negligence. That is the law 
which, consistent with existing Utah law, should be adopted by 
this Court. 
B. Paragraphs 7 and 16 of the lease establish that 
Defendant is liable for loss by fire caused by its own 
negligence. 
Two paragraphs or provisions in the lease drafted by 
Defendant's attorney clearly establish that Defendant is liable 
for damages resulting from its own negligence: 
Paragraph 7, the "redelivery" provision, required 
Defendant, at the expiration of the lease, to return the 
premises in the same condition as when the lease was entered 
into, and it contained an express exception for "damage by fire 
and casualty not the fault of LESSEE [Defendant]." (Emphasis 
added) 
5/ Those earlier cases — among them Rizzuto v. Morris, 592 
P2d 688 (Wash App 1979) ; Sutton v. Jondahl. 532 P2d 478 (Okl 
App 1975) ; Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. J^hn Co., 131 NE2d 100 
(111 1955) ; General Mills v. Goldman, 184 F2d 359 (8th Cir 
1950) — did not deal with leases containing the indemnity and 
redelivery provisions found here. In addition, the leases in 
those cases were not, as in this matter, prepared by the party 
seeking indemnity who also negotiated a i?ent reduction while 
shifting insurance expenses to the landlqrd. 
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Paragraph 16(a) required Defendant to "indemnify and 
save LESSOR [Plaintiffs] harmless from all loss, damage, 
liability, or expense incurred by LESSOR due to the exclusive 
negligent acts or omissions to act of LESSEE [Defendant]•" 
(Emphasis added) 
The case of Cerny-Pickas & Company v. C. R. Jahn 
Company, supra, is instructive in this regard in that the court 
discussed both of those provisions. Although the court held 
that the lessee in that case was exempt from liability, the 
redelivery provision did not contain the critical language "not 
the fault of LESSEE." The significance of that omission is 
clear because, in rejecting the lessor's argument that the 
redelivery provision did not relieve the lessee from liability, 
the court stated: 
"To express the meaning for which the lessor 
contends, the lease would have to be altered 
to modify the word 'fire' by the qualifying 
words 'not due to lessee's negligence.'" 
131 NE2d at 103. Clearly, the court felt that the inclusion of 
that phrase (which was included in the lease in this matter) 
would have established the lessee's liability for damage 
resulting from its own negligence. 
The significance of the phrase "not the fault of 
LESSEE" is also discussed in Enqlehardt v. Triple X Chemical 
Laboratories, 369 NE2d 67 (111 App 1977). The redelivery 
provision in that case contained the crucial exception for 
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"loss by fire and other casualty not caused by the lessee." 
3 69 NE2d at 69. As such, the court ruled: 
"The [phrase "not caused by the lessee"] 
evidences the intent of the parties that 
lessee must yield-up the leased premises to 
the lessor in good condition and repair at 
the termination of the lease, including 
situations in which the lessee has caused a 
loss by fire to occur. Therefore, we are 
able to permissibly draw the reverse 
inference from that drawn by the Illinois 
Supreme Court in Cerny-Pickas f supra1 and 
find that plaintiffs-lessors need not look 
to its [sic] fire insurance carrier for 
recovery for fire loss caused by 
defendant-lessee." 
Id. 
The result reached by the court in Enqlehardt, supra, 
is precisely the result that the trial court should have 
reached in this matter given the express exception in the 
redelivery provision (Paragraph 7) of the lease for "damage by 
fire and casualty not the fault of LESSEE [Defendant]," and 
also given the clear meaning of Paragraph 16, by which 
Defendant agreed to indemnify and save the lessor (Plaintiffs) 
harmless from "all loss, damage, liability, or expense incurred 
by LESSOR due to the exclusive negligent acts or omissions to 
act of LESSEE." Paragraphs 7 and 16, in$erted by Defendant's 
attorney, clearly establish that Defendant is liable for loss 
by fire caused by its own negligence. Ti\e trial court's 
contrary ruling ignored the clear language of those two 
provisions and, in particular, rendered useless the phrase "not 
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the fault of LESSEE" contained in Paragraph 7. As the Court 
stated in DuBois v. Nye, supra; "We will not torture the 
language to find a construction that will justify immunity 
where none was intended," 584 P2d at 827. 
C. Even if Paragraphs 7 and 16 of the lease are 
somehow ambiguous, they should be construed against Defendant, 
the drafter of the lease. Alternatively, and as the trial 
court initially and correctly ruled, there is a material issue 
of fact as to the parties7 intent at the time the lease was 
executed. 
It is significant that, in denying Defendant's initial 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court (Judge Billings) 
ruled that "the parties to the lease should be able to contract 
around [the] presumption [that the lessee is a coinsured of the 
lessor, thereby barring a subrogation action by the insurer 
against its own insured] * * * [and that] it appears that the 
parties attempted to do just that." (App-19) Accordingly, the 
trial court (Judge Billings) correctly denied Summary Judgment 
to Defendant on the basis that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the parties' intentions. However, in 
ruling on Defendant's second Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
trial court (Judge Young) erroneously granted Summary Judgment 
for Defendant on the basis that the evidence as to the parties' 
intentions established that there was not an express intent "to 
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reserve to [Safeco] the right to subrogate against 
[Defendant]." (App-27) 
It is also significant that Judge Billings expressly 
stated that, "[i]n considering the redelivery and indemnity 
provisions [Paragraphs 7 and 16] in conjunction with the 
insurance clause [Paragraph 9], the Court finds there is an 
ambiguity in the lease." (App-16-17) Judge Billings also 
expressly noted that "the lease at issue in this case is not an 
adhesion contract; rather, it was prepared and drafted by 
attorneys for [Defendant]." (App-19 n.6) 
Thus, if the lease provisions are construed to be 
somehow ambiguous, any such ambiguity should be strictly 
construed against Defendant, whose attorney prepared and was 
the sole author of the lease. Holley v. Federal-American 
Partners, 507 P2d 381 (Utah 1973) (the Court held that when a 
lease is drafted by attorneys representing lessees, the lessor 
will not be chargeable with drafting the lease and the court 
should resolve any uncertainties in the lessor's favor); Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. El Paso, supra, 17 Utah 2d at 260 (the 
Court dealt with a contract prepared by a party seeking to be 
immunized from liability for its own negligence); Continental 
Bank And Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 102, 306 P2d 773 
(1957). 
Because Defendant prepared the lease, any ambiguities 
in the lease must be construed against Defendant. This rule of 
construction, combined with the language of Paragraphs 7 and 
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16, supports a ruling that those Paragraphs establish 
Defendant's liability for damage caused by its own negligence. 
Alternatively, this Court should affirm the initial 
and correct ruling of the trial court (Judge Billings) denying 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that there 
is a material issue of fact as to the parties' intent at the 
time the lease was executed. The contrary and erroneous ruling 
of the trial court (Judge Young) is simply incompatible with 
the previous ruling by Judge Billings and with the evidence in 
this matter construed, as it must be, in a light most favorable 
to Plaintiffs.5/ 
The trial court's entry of Summary Judgment for 
Defendant is contrary to established law that a motion for 
summary judgment can only be granted where there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and, even taking as true the facts 
asserted by the nonmoving party, that party could not prevail. 
Gadd v. Olson, 685 P2d 1041, 1043 (Utah 1984). The trial 
court's ruling also is contrary to the established policy that 
a court must act cautiously on motions for summary judgment in 
order to ensure that a party whose case has merit is not 
deprived of access to the courts. McBride v. Jones, 615 P2d 
431, 432 (Utah 1980). 
6/ In deciding this appeal, this Court reviews de novo and 
considers the Record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 
the parties opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, and all 
doubts must be resolved in Plaintiffs' favor. Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P2d 776, 778 (Utah 1984). 
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In her correct ruling denying Defendant's initial 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Billings noted the following 
factors that should be considered in determining the intent of 
the parties (which factors caused the court to deny Defendant's 
first Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact on that i^sue): 
"1. Whether the lessors had taken the 
responsibility of insuring the leased 
building in an adequate amount against the 
risk of fire; 
"2. If so, whether the lessee was 
aware of this action; 
"3. Whether the lessee understood the 
lease to exempt it from liability for all 
fires including those of negligent origin; 
"4. Whether the lessor adjusted its 
rental rate upward to compensate for the 
fire insurance coverage." 
(App-18) 
Given those factors, none of th^ additional discovery 
that was undertaken following the correct denial of Defendant's 
initial Motion for Summary Judgment produced any evidence 
which, construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, could 
form the basis of a judgment as a matter of law for Defendant. 
On the contrary, that evidence, which will now be discussed, 
establishes a factual dispute as to the intent of the parties. 
Doug Kettle and Jon Gilbert, on behalf of Defendant, 
entered into negotiations with Doctors Ahderson and Packer, on 
behalf of Fashion Place Associates, to r^new the lease. 
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Defendants attorney, Patricia Marlowe, prepared and was the 
sole author of the lease. 
Kettle testified that, during his negotiations with 
Anderson and Packer, there were no discussions about insurance 
and that, in reviewing the lease with Anderson and Packer, he 
never discussed how much insurance was to be provided, the type 
of (other than fire) insurance that was to be provided, whether 
proof of insurance would be required, or whether Defendant 
would be named as an insured in the insurance policy. (CR 4467 
pp 17, 31-32) Kettle also testified that, in reviewing the 
lease with the doctors, he did not discuss Paragraph 7 (the 
redelivery provision) or Paragraph 16 (the indemnity provision) 
and he did not discuss subrogation or a waiver of subrogation, 
but he admitted knowing what indemnity meant and that he was 
aware that an indemnity provision (Paragraph 16) was included 
in the lease. (Id. at pp 24-25, 28-29) Significantly, Kettle 
testified that he did not believe that Paragraph 9 (the 
insurance provision) contradicted the effect of Paragraphs 7 
and 16. (Id. at 56-57) 
Kettle's testimony establishes that Defendant 
deliberately included the redelivery and indemnity provisions 
(Paragraphs 7 and 16) in the lease, that Defendant understood 
the effect of the indemnity provision (Paragraph 16), and that 
the provision requiring the landlord to pay for fire insurance 
(Paragraph 9) did not contradict Defendant's liabilities under 
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the redelivery and indemnity provisions• Consequently, a jury 
could reasonably determine that Defendant did not intend that 
Plaintiffs waive Safeco7s subrogation rights and did 
acknowledge and understand that Defendant} would remain liable 
for damages caused by its own negligence. 
Defendant's attorney, Marlowe, testified that she 
understood any ambiguity in the lease agreement that she 
prepared would be construed against Defendant (CR 4492 p 72), 
that no one asked her to insert a nonsubrogation or waiver of 
subrogation clause in the lease (jld. at 35, 73) , and that she 
had never heard of the Alaska Ins., supr^, decision and did not 
even know what subrogation meant (id. at pp 35, 43-44, 71). 
She testified that she did not review or research the effect of 
the provisions that she included in the lease, but that she 
included Paragraphs 7 and 16 because they were generally 
included in other leases prepared for Defendant. (Id. at 
pp 32, 50, 52, 70) Based on that evidence, a jury could 
reasonably find that Defendant intentionally inserted the 
redelivery and indemnity provisions in the lease, the import of 
which Defendant's attorney knew or should have known, and that 
the insurance provision was inserted without any intent to 
waive Safeco's subrogation rights. 
Doctors Anderson and Packer both testified that it was 
their intent that all tenants in the Building would be liable 
for damages caused by their own negligence, and that their 
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review of the lease did not reveal anything that would 
contradict their understanding that Defendant would be liable 
for damage caused by its own negligence. (CR 3397, 4003) 
Accordingly, Defendant's rent was not adjusted upward and, in 
fact, Defendant dictated the amount of the rent. (CR 3998, 
4004) They also testified that it was not Plaintiffs' intent 
to release Defendant from liability for its own negligence. 
(CR 3998, 4004) 
All of this evidence, construed in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs, clearly demonstrates a material issue 
of fact as to the intent of the parties concerning Defendant's 
liability for its own negligence. Doctors Anderson and Packer 
did not intend to immunize Defendant from liability. 
Defendant's own agents never even thought of or discussed 
waiver of subrogation, while at the same time they 
intentionally inserted in the lease redelivery and indemnity 
provisions, the meaning of which they understood. 
The evidence does not address the following factors 
that Judge Billings noted should be considered: First, 
although Plaintiffs, as lessor, agreed to provide fire 
insurance, because of the substantial uninsured loss there is a 
question of fact as to whether the insurance obtained was "in 
an adequate amount against the risk of fire." Second, although 
Defendant passed the burden of obtaining fire insurance to the 
landlord, the testimony of Defendant's agent (Kettle) leaves 
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open the question of whether Defendant was aware or made any 
efforts to become aware of the amount of fire insurance 
actually procured or the parties that were covered by the 
landlord's insurance policy. Third, therie is a factual dispute 
whether Defendant understood or intended that the lease 
provisions exempted it from liability for all fires, including 
those caused by its own negligence. Finally, the evidence 
clearly shows that Plaintiffs did not adjust the rental rate 
upward to compensate for the fire insurance coverage. 
Accordingly, the trial court (J. Billings) initially 
and correctly denied Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
but the court (J. Young) subsequently errfed in granting 
Defendant's renewed Motion. 
II 
The trial court erred in ruling that the 
lease does not contain an express provision 
reserving Safeco's right of subrogation and 
in ruling that two particular p4ragraphs in 
the lease constituted pre-loss Releases of 
Safeco's subrogation rights. 
After Defendant's initial Motion for Summary Judgment 
was correctly denied by Judge Billings on the basis that there 
are material issues of fact as to the parties' intent on the 
subrogation issue, the trial court (Judg$ Young) summarily and 
erroneously granted Defendant's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment: 
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"The Court basis [sic] its Order 
granting [Defendant's] Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that the 
undisputed material facts establish that 
there was no expressed intent on the part of 
the parties to the Lease to reserve to 
Safeco Insurance Company the right to 
subrogate against [Defendant]. Therefore, 
[Defendant] is presumed to be a co-insured 
of Safeco, thereby barring any subrogation 
by Safeco against [Defendant] for any claims 
paid by Safeco as the result of the May 1, 
1983 [fire]. 
"Further, the Court basis [sic] its 
decision granting [Defendant's] Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on the Court's 
determination that, as a matter of law, 
paragraphs 9 and 19 of the March 1, 1981 
Lease are pre-loss releases by the lessors 
of any subrogation claims that Safeco may 
have as a result of the May 1, 1983 fire." 
(App-27) 
The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that the lease did not contain an express provision reserving 
Safeco's right of subrogation against Defendant and in ruling 
that Paragraphs 9 and 19 constituted pre-loss releases of 
Safeco's subrogation rights. Neither the provision in the 
lease requiring the lessor to procure fire insurance (Paragraph 
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9)1/ nor the standard, boilerplate provision that all other 
provisions in the lease inured to the benefit of the parties 
(Paragraph 19)^/ was intended or should b^ construed as a 
matter of law as an agreement by Plaintiffs (lessor) to release 
Defendant (tenant/lessee) from liability for its own 
negligence, particularly where the evidence of the parties7 
intent shows otherwise. 
It is not surprising that the trial court did not cite 
any authority in support of its ruling in this regard, and none 
of the following cases relied upon by Defendant support that 
ruling: 
In Koennecke v. Waxwinq Cedar Piuuucts, Ltd,, 543 P2d 
669 (Or 1975) , the parties to the lease had orallv acrreed 
7/ Paragraph 9 of the lease provides: 
"Responsibility for utilities, taxes, and 
insurance shall be as indicated: 
"Power (L [Lessor]), Heat (L), Water (L), Sewer 
(L), Telephone (T [Lessee]), Real Property Tax 
(L), Increase in Real Property Tax (L), Fire 
Insurance on Building (L), Fire Insurance on 
Personal Property (L), Glass Insurance (L)." 
(App-3) 
8/ Paragraph 19 of the lease provides: 
"The covenants and agreements contained in this 
lease shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be 
binding upon the parties hereto, their heirs, 
distributees, executors, administrators, legal 
representatives, assigns, and upon their respective 
successors in interest, except as otherwise expressly 
hereinbefore provided." (App-6) 
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that the lessee would not be responsible for damage to the 
leased property and that the landlord would insure the leased 
equipment. While the court ruled in favor of the lessee, it 
did so because two oral agreements, taken together, made it 
clear that the lessor did not intend to hold the lessee 
responsible. 543 P2d at 672. In this matter, however, there 
was no agreement, oral or written, that Defendant would not be 
responsible for damage to the leased property. It is 
significant that the court in Koennecke did not rule that an 
agreement to provide fire insurance constituted a pre-loss 
release. 
In Waterway Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord Mechanical 
Con., 406 P2d 556 (Or 1965), the contract between the parties 
contained an exculpatory provision which specifically stated 
that the contractor would not be held liable for certain loss 
or damage. In addition, the contractual provisions required 
the plaintiff to obtain fire insurance specifically for the 
contractor's protection. The court construed the two 
provisions together and determined that, in light of the 
exculpatory provision, the parties had agreed that the 
contractor would not be liable for damage caused by its own 
negligence. The court in Waterway Terminals did not rule that 
an agreement to procure fire insurance by itself constituted a 
pre-loss release. 
In Insurance Co., Etc. v. Universal Mortq. Corp., 262 
NW2d 92 (Wis 1978), the lease agreement contained the following 
language: 
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"Landlord shall not be liable to Tenant for 
any such damage or injury, in any event, to 
the extent Tenant's insurance provides 
compensation therefor." 
262 NW2d at 93. As a result, the court ruled that the parties 
had agreed that the tenant would not be liable, to the extent 
of the insurance proceeds, for damage caused by its 
negligence. The lease agreement in this matter, however, 
contains no such provision. 
Similarly, in Extaza of 34th Street v. City Stores 
Co., 467 NE2d 889 (NY App 1984), the tenant had given a prior 
written release of liability to the landlord and, based on that 
release, the court held that the tenant's insurer had no 
subrogation rights. In this matter, Plaintiffs clearly did 
not give Defendant such prior written release. 
Defendant cited no case authority whatsoever for its 
contention that Paragraph 19 is a pre-lo^s release of 
liability. Defendant merely argued that Paragraph 9 will not 
inure to the benefit of Defendant, as required by Paragraph 19, 
unless Paragraph 9 is construed as the trial court did. 
However, as the trial court (Judge Young) even noted, Defendant 
benefits from Paragraph 9 to the extent that it has insurance 
coverage for all losses not caused by its negligence. (CR 4494 
p 15) If so construed, Paragraph 9 is perfectly consistent 
with Paragraphs 7 and 16 of the lease. 
Thus, none of the cases cited by Defendant support the 
trial court's erroneous ruling that a provision to Drovide fire 
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insurance somehow constitutes a pre-loss release of liability. 
The cases cited by Defendant dealt with lease provisions or 
agreements not present in this matter. By granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on this farfetched theory, the 
trial court allowed Defendant to dress up its "implied 
coinsured" argument and parade it before the court under a 
different name. 
Ill 
The trial court erred in dismissing all of 
the subrogation claims where some of those 
claims were brought by virtue of insurance 
policies issued to other tenants who were 
not parties to the lease involving Defendant. 
A fatal flaw of the Summary Judgment entered in favor 
of Defendant is that it is based on a theory (the coinsured 
waiver of subrogation theory) that cannot apply to claims that 
were brought by virtue of insurance policies issued to other 
tenants who were not parties to the lease involving Defendant. 
Safeco should not be precluded from bringing subrogation 
actions based on policies that were issued to tenants who were 
not parties to that lease. 
Safeco issued one insurance policy to Fashion Place 
Investment, Ltd., the successor in interest to Fashion Place 
Associates, the landlord. Safeco issued separate individual 
policies to other tenants who were not parties to the lease 
between Fashion Place Associates and Defendant. Safeco, 
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pursuant to its obligations under all of those insurance 
policies, paid the landlord for damage to the Building and for 
business interruption• Safeco also made payments to tenants 
for damage to their personal property and for business 
interruption. 
The trial court did not expressly rule on this issue. 
However, to the extent the court granted Summary Judgment for 
Defendant on all of Safeco's claims because of Defendant's 
status as an implied coinsured, the trial court's ruling is 
contrary to established law that an implied coinsured is 
insured only to the extent of the interest and coverage agreed 
upon and that an insurer can subrogate for losses beyond the 
extent of the contractual agreement. 
The case of Agra-By-Products, Inc. v. Agway, Inc., 347 
NW2d i42 (ND 1984), is instructive to this matter in that the 
.court held that a lease provision providing for insurance for 
mutual protection of the parties7 insurable interest in the 
leased premises does not absolve the lessee from liability for 
damage caused by its negligence to buildijngs or other property 
not subject to the lease. Just as Defendant contends in this 
matter, the tenant in that case sought complete immunity from 
liability for damage on the basis that it was an implied 
coinsured under the lessor's policy. In addition to damage to 
the leased premises, certain property that was not subject to 
the parties' lease agreement was damaged or destroyed in a 
fire. The tenant argued that it could not be held liable for 
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that damage because it was an implied coinsured under one 
policy covering the leased building. The court rejected that 
argument: 
"We conclude that Agway is limited in its 
protection under the lease to the extent of 
insurance coverage provided for by 'the 
insurance provisions in full force and 
effect as shown by policy of insurance 
attached [to] and made a part [of the 
lease].' We construe this provision to 
include all insurance, in effect at the time 
of the fire, purchased by Agra on the leased 
property during the term of the lease with 
Agway. 
"Nor do we construe the lease so as to 
absolve Agway from liability for damage 
caused by its negligence to buildings or 
other property not subject to the lease. 
Agway argues that it was foreseeable that if 
a fire broke out it could spread to adjacent 
buildings or equipment, leased or nonleased, 
and that the insurance coverage provided by 
paragraph 5 of the lease was intended to 
provide the sole source of compensation for 
any and all fire losses. We do not construe 
the lease so broadly. There is no provision 
in the lease that has any application to 
non-leased property. Such property is 
beyond the terms of the lease. See Sannit 
v. Aarons, 297 F. Supp. 798, 800 (D. Del. 
1969)." 
347 NW2d at 151-52 (footnote omitted). 
Several other courts also have held that an implied 
coinsured is insured only to the extent of the interest and 
coverage agreed upon, and that an insurer can therefore 
subrogate for losses beyond the extent of the contractual 
agreement. See Turner Const. Co. v. John B. Kelly Co., 442 F 
Supp 551 (ED Pa 1976); Paul Tishman Co. v. Carney & Del 
Guidice, Inc., 36 AD2d 273 (NYAD 1971), aff'd 316 NE2d 875 (NY 
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1974); McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France, Inc., 
515 SW2d 32 (Tex Civ App 1974); Public Serv. Co. of Okl. v. 
Black & Veatch, Consul. Eng.. 328 F Supp 14 (ND Okl 1971); 
Baltimore Contract., Inc. v. Circle Floor- Co. of Wash., Inc., 
318 F Supp 106 (D Md 1970); Employers7 Fire Insurance Co. v. 
Behunin, 275 F Supp 399 (D Colo 1967). 
If Defendant is found to be an implied coinsured under 
Safeco7s insurance policy issued to Fashion Place Investors, 
Ltd., Defendant's implied coinsured status is limited to the 
portion of the Building leased to Defendant. Safeco may bring 
subrogation actions to recover payments made to insureds for 
damage to those insureds7 personal property and for business 
interruption losses suffered by those insureds, none of whom 
were parties to the lease involving Defendant. In addition, 
Safeco should be allowed to bring a subrogation action to 
recover any business interruption losses [paid to Fashion Place 
Investors, because the insurance provision in the lease makes 
no reference to business interruption insurance. 
Accordingly, the Summary Judgment awarded Defendant 
was, if not totally flawed, at least overbroad and should be 
reversed insofar as it granted Judgment ofc claims that were 
brought by virtue of insurance policies issued to other tenants 
who were not parties to the lease involving Defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Judgment entered in favor of Defendant should be 
reversed and a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs or, in 
the alternative, the matter should be remanded to the trial 
court, 
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APPENDIX 
App-1 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
This l e a s e agreement i s made and execu ted t h i s 1 s t 
day of March, 1981 , by and between S a l t Lake County, a body 
c o r p o r a t e and p o l i t i c o f the S t a t e o f Utah for i t s Div i s ion 
o f Mental H e a l t h , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as LESSEE and 
Fashion P l ace A s s o c i a t e s , a Utah p a r t n e r s h i p , h e r e i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d to as LESSOR. 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
Tha t , fo r and in c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the payments to be 
made he reunde r and the mutual p r o m i s e s , c o v e n a n t s , and c o n d i t i o n s 
h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h to be keptt and performed, the p a r t i e s 
hereby agree as f o l l o w s : 
1 . LESSOR does h e r e b y l e a s e to LESSEE 13,581 square f e e t 
o f o f f i c e space l o c a t e d a t 6065 South 3rd E a s t , Murray, Utah. 
The above -desc r ibed p r o p e r t y i s h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to in t h i s 
l e a s e as the PREMISES. 
2 . LESSEE i s to have and to h o l d t h e PREMISES for the 
term of 3 y e a r s b e g i n n i n g on March 1, 1981 through February 29, 
1984. 
3. LESSEE s h a l l pay to LESSOR as r e n t dur ing the f i r s t 
year of t h i s l e a s e t he sum o f $ 8 8 , 2 7 6 . 5 0 , the s a i d sura to be 
p a i d in 12 equa l monthly i n s t a l l m e n t s of $ 7 , 3 5 6 . 3 8 , due in 
advance on the f i r s t day o f each month. LESSEE s h a l l pay to 
LESSOR as r e n t d u r i n g the second y e a r o f t h i s l e a s e the sum 
of $97 ,104 .15 , the s a i d sum to b£ p a i d in 12 equal monthly 
i n s t a l l m e n t s of $ 8 , 0 9 2 . 0 1 , due ii|i advance on the f i r s t day 
of each month. LESSEE s h a l l pay to LESSOR as r e n t dur ing the 
t h i r d year o f t h i s l e a s e the sum of $101 ,959 .36 , the s a i d sum 
to be paid in 12 equa l monthly ins t a l l r e n t s o f ^ 8 ^ 4 9 6 . 6 1 , ^due i' 
in advance on the f i r s t day of e^ch month. LESSEE agrees to 
pay the f i r s t monthly i n s t a l l m e n t of $7 ,356 .38 and the l a s t 
monthly i n s t a l l m e n t of $3 ,496 .16 upon e x e c u t i o n of t h i s l e a s e . 
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4 . LESSOR agrees to make such a l t e r a t i o n s and changes ii 
the PREMISES as may be needful and necessary to adapt the same 
for the uses and purposes o f LESSEE and to the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f 
LESSEE and t h e r e a f t e r to keep the s a i d PREMISES in a constant 
s t a t e o f r e p a i r to the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f LESSEE during the contin 
of t h i s l e a s e . LESSOR hereby agrees to make the fo l lowing impr 
ments and a l t e r a t i o n s : 
a. I n s t a l l new pane l ing in the o f f i c e s a t $13.00 per 
sheet o f p a n e l i n g . 
b . D e r o l i s h one panel wa l l with window. Replace with 
sheetrock s tud w a l l extended 7-1 /2 f e e t i n t o r e c e p t i o n area. 
New room s i z e w i l l be 9 - 1 / 2 f e e t by 20 f e e t . Carpet i s to be 
r e l a i d in the ha l lway and LESSEE'S carpet allowance i s $17.00 
per yard. 
c . Demolish w a l l s surrounding c l o s e t and the adjacent 
bathroom to c r e a t e a hal lway between the two s u i t e s o f o f f i c e s . 
d. Bui ld one 8 f o o t s tud wa l l to p a r t i t i o n o f f small 
o f f i c e on west s i d e o f north entry to inc lude one window. 
e. To remove doors , doorways and w a l l s on each s ide o f 
h a l l main en trance , north s i d e , back to corner. 
f. Remove door to conference room and rep lace with 
salvage door o f appropr iate swing to have_doors swing into 
conference room i n s t e a d o f swinging out i n t o h a l l . 
g. Remove a l l c a r p e t in main foyer as d i r e c t e d by LESS 
and replace wi th new carpe t o f one co lor at an al lowance of $1 
per yard to LESSEE. 
h. To b u i l d one wa l l 16 f ee t long with door and one wa 
5 f ee t with door to block o f f records room in the basement. 
i . Remove 2 doors and 1 window in v e s t i b u l e entrance i 
basement on south s i d e . 
j . Sheetrock and tape a l l new c o n s t r u c t i o n - t o t i e i t 
Into e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e . To repair suspended c e i l i n g s in area 
a f f ec t ed by new c o n s t r u c t i o n and to paint a l l new construct ior 
back to the c l o s e s t v e r t i c a l break in o lane . 
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5. LESSEE agrees to pay LESSOR the sura of $6 300.00 
upon execut ion o f t h i s l e a s e for the improvements and a l t e r a t i o n 
s e t forth in paragraph 4 aboVe. In the event that the improve-
ments and a l t e r a t i o n s performed by LESSOR exceed or are l e s s tha 
the sum o f $6300 .00 , t h i s agreement s h a l l be amended accordingly 
6. The premises s h a l l be used by LESSEE, i t s departments 
agenc ie s , or d i v i s i o n s for admin i s t ra t ive and bus iness operat ion 
or for other funct ions and masters o f LESSEE. 
7. At the e x p i r a t i o n Of the term o f t h i s l e a s e , LESSEE 
w i l l y i e l d and d e l i v e r up the PREMISES to LESSOR in as good orde 
and condi t ion as when the sam^ were entered upon by the LESSEE, 
reasonable use and wear thereof , damage by f i r e and casua l ty not 
the f a u l t o f LESSEE and damage by elements excepted therefrom. 
8. R e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the maintenance s h a l l be as indicai 
LESSEE r e s p o n s i b l e for (T) an4 LESSOR respons ib l e for (L): 
Roof (L) , E x t e r i o r Walls (L) , I n t e r i o r Walls (L) , 
S truc tura l Repair (L) , Cnterior Decorating ( L ) , 
I n t e r i o r Pa in t ing (L) , Yard Surfac ing (L) , 
Plumbing L ines , Equipment and Fixtures (L) , 
Heating and Air Condi t ion ing Equipment (L) , 
E l e c t r i c a l Lines and Equipment (L) , Light Globes and 
Tubes (L) , Glass Breakage (L) , Trash Removal (L) 
Snow Removal (L) , Jan i tpr (L) . 
9 . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y for u t i l i t i e s , t a x e s , and insurance 
s h a l l be as i n d i c a t e d : 
Power (L) , Heat (L) , Water (L) . Sewer (L) , Telephone (T) , 
Real Property Tax (L) , Increase in Real Property Tax (L) , 
Fire Insurance on Build|ing (L) , Fire Insurance on Personal 
Property (L) , Glass Insurance (L) . 
10. LESSOR hereby warrants that i t i s the fee simple ovne 
with the l e g a l r ight to l e a s e Said premises and agrees - to coinply 
with a l l codes , ord inances , and s t a t e s t a t u t e s appl icable to the 
ownership and operat ion of the oremises a t h i s so le expense. 
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11. LESSEE s h a l l have the r i g h t to sign th i s lease or to 
sublet the PREMISES or any p a r t thereof with the consent of LESS 
LESSOR agrees not to unreasonably withhold consent to assign or 
suble t . 
12. LESSOR covenants with LESSEE tha t upon ful ly complyi 
with and properly performing a l l of the terms, condi t ions , and 
covenants hereof to be performed by LESSEE, sa id LESSEE sha l l ha 
and quie t ly enjoy the PREMISES for the terms se t forth here in . 
13. I f the whole of the PREMISES sha l l be taken by any 
public or governmental a u t h o r i t y under the power of eminent 
domain, then the term of t h i s l ease s h a l l cease as of the date 
possession i s taken by such a u t h o r i t y and the lease payments 
hereunder s h a l l be paid through the date of possession and not 
the rea f te r . I f only a pa r t of the PREMISES sha l l be taken and 
the remainder not so taken remains tenantab le for the purposes 
for which LESSEE has been using the PREMISES, then t h i s lease 
sha l l continue In fu l l force and e f fec t as to sa id remainder and 
a l l of the provisions hereof s h a l l continue except t h a t the 
LESSOR agrees t ha t I t w i l l nego t i a t e a reduct ion in the lease 
payments to be made hereunder commensurate with the then appraiser 
value of the remainder. I f the remaining par t of the PREMISES 
i s untenantable for LESSEE'S purposes, then LESSEE may terminate 
th is lease by giving w r i t t e n n o t i c e thereof to LESSOR. The term 
"eminent domain" as used in t h i s paragraph sha l l include the 
exercise of any s i m i l a r governmental power and any purchase or 
acquis i t ion in l i e u thereof by a governmental e n t i t y . 
14. I f the demised PREMISES are completely destroyed by 
f i re or o ther casua l ty , t h i s l ease s h a l l terminate on the day of 
such f i re or casual ty and no r e n t a l amount sha l l accrue or be 
paid by LESSEE on th i s lease t h e r e a f t e r . In the event of pa r t i a l 
destruct ion or damage so as to render the PRESSES t o t a l l y or 
p a r t i a l l y untentable , e i t h e r par ty nay terminate this lease by 
giving wri t ten not ice thereof to the o ther party within 15 days 
af ter said p a r t i a l des t ruc t ion or damage and no ren ta l amount 
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s h a l l accrue or be paid by LESSEE on t h i s l e a s e a f t e r the 
s p e c i f i e d t erminat ion date . | n the event of e i t h e r o f the 
foregoing t e r m i n a t i o n s , LESSER s h a l l not be l i a b l e for damages 
o f any kind because o f such t e r m i n a t i o n s . Upon terminat ion, 
LESSEE s h a l l r e l i n q u i s h p o s s e s s i o n o f the PREMISES. 
15. In the event o f f a i l u r e by LESSOR to provide any 
s e r v i c e s , u t i l i t y maintenance, or r e p a i r s required under t h i s 
agreement and s a i d f a i l u r e remaining uncorrected a f t e r wr i t t en 
n o t i c e to LESSOR, LESSEE s h a l l have the r ight to secure sa id 
s e r v i c e s and u t i l i t i e s , maintenance or r e p a i r s , and to deduct 
the c o s t s t h e r e o f from r e n t a l bayments. 
16. (a) LESSEE s h a l l indemnify and save LESSOR harmless 
from a l l l o s s , damage, l i a b i l i t y , or expense incurred by LESSOR 
due to the e x c l u s i v e n e g l i g e n t a c t s o r omissions to ac t o f 
LESSEE, i t s o f f i c e r s , employee^, or agents a r i s i n g out o f 
LESSEE'S use or o p e r a t i o n o f tl^e PREMISES and s h a l l not permit 
any l i e n or o t h e r c l a i m or demand to be enforced aga ins t the 
PREMISES by reason o f LESSEE'S use o f the PREMISES. 
(b) LESSOR s h a l l indemnify and save LESSEE harmless 
from a l l l o s s , damage, l i a b i l i t y , or expense incurred by LESSEE 
due to the e x c l u s i v e n e g l i g e n t a c t s or omissions to act o f 
LESSOR, i t s o f f i c e r s , employees , or agents a r i s i n g out of 
LESSOR'S use or ownership o f the PREMISES. 
(c) LESSOR agrees t h a t i n the event any l£en, c laim, 
or demand i s enforced a g a i n s t the PREMISES because o f LESSOR'S 
ownership thereo f , which l i e n , c la im, or demand s h a l l deprive 
LESSEE o f i t s use or p o s s e s s i o n o f che PREMISES thereupon, t h i s 
l e a s e s h a l l immediately terminate and LESSEE s h a l l not be l i a b l e 
for l ease payments a f t e r the terminat ion date . 
17. I t i s agreed that the waiving o f any o f the covenants 
o f th i s l e a s e by e i t h e r party s h a l l be l i m i t e d to the part icu lar 
ins tance and s h a l l not be dcemecfl to waive any of the other breachei 
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of such covenant or any provision therein contained. 
18. In the event e i ther party shal l enforce the terms 
of this lease by a su i t or otherwise, the party at fault shall 
pay costs and expenses incident thereto including reasonable 
attorney's fees . 
19. The covenants and agreements contained in this 
lease shal l apply to , inure to the benefit of, and be binding 
upon the parties hereto, their he i r s , distr ibutees , executors, 
administrators, l ega l representatives, ass igns, and upon their 
respective successors in in teres t , except as otherwise express 
hereinbefore provided. 
20. This lease agreement may be terminated by either 
party by sending written notice to the other party at least 90 
days in advance of the desired cancellation or termination date 
21. All not ices or other communications hereunder shall 
be in writing and may be given by -delivery in person or by 
registered mail, return receipt requested, to the parties as 
follows: 
LESSOR: Fashion Place Associates 
6065 South Third East 
Murray, Utah 
LESSEE: Division of Mental Health 
6065 South Third East 
Murray, Utah 
and 
Salt Lake County Administrative Services Department 
Real Estate Division 
135 East 2100 South, Building #3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
22. It is expressly understood and agreed between the 
parties hereto that this lease agreement supercedes the three 
prior lease agreements and all amendments thereto between che 
parties. 
23. LESSEE shall have an option to purchase Che PREMISES 
or any pare thereof during the term of this lease agreement for 
the fair market value of the real property and che building at 
the cine chat LESSEE exercises its option. The fair market valL 
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p u r c h a s e p r i c e s h a l l b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e a v e r a g e o f t h e a p p r a 
o f an a p p r a i s e r c h o s e n b y LESSOR, an a p p r a i s e r c h o s e n by LESSE 
and an a p p r a i s e r c h o s e n j o i n t l y b y LESSOR a n d LESSEE. The f a i 
xnarket v a l u e p u r c h a s e p r i c e s h a l l b e d e c r e a s e d by a n y improve r s 
made a n d . b r p a i d f o r by LESSEE d u r i n g t h e t e r m o f t h i s l e a s e a g r e e 
and f u r t h e r d e c r e a s e d b y a p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e l e a s e p a y m e n t s mac 
u n d e r t h i s l e a s e a g r e e m e n t , s a i d p e r c e n t a g e t o be a g r e e d upon b 
t h e p a r t i e s a n d made a p a r t o f t h i s l e a s e a g r e e m e n t by amendmen 
t h e r e t o . T h i s o p t i o n t o purchase i s s u b j e c t to LESSOR'S des i re to s e l l 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF t h e p a r t i e s h a v e s u b s c r i b e d t h e i r nam( 
h e r e o n a n d h a v e c a u s e d t h i s l e a s e a g r e e m e n t t o be d u l y e x e c u t e d 
on t h e d a y a n d y e a r f i r s t a b o v e w r i t t e n , 
LESSEE: 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTEST: 
W i l l i a m E. Dunn, Cha i rman" 
B o a r d o f C o u n t y C o m m i s s i o n e r s 
S a l t Lake Coun ty C o m m i s s i o n e r 
W. S t e r l i n g E v a n s 
S a l t Lake C o u n t y C l e r k 
c 0;;irr 
LESSOR: 
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES 
R o b e r t A n d e r s o n , G e n e r a l P a r t n e r 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County o f S a l t Lake ) ss 
On t h i s day o f M a r c h , 1 9 8 1 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b e f o r e 
me Rober t A n d e r s o n , t h e s i g n e r o f t h e f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t , who b e : 
by me d u l y s w o r n , d i d s a y t h a t he i s che C e n e r a l P a r t n e r o f F a s h i o r 
P l a c e A s s o c i a t e s , a p a r t n e r s h i p a n d t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t 
was du ly a u t h o r i z e d by t h e p a r t n e r s h i p a t a l a w f u l m e e t i n g du ly h e l 
o r by a u t h o r i t y o f i t s b y l a w s a n d ' s i g n e d i n b e h a l f o f s a i d p a r t n e r s 
My co n-ni s s i o n e x p i r e s N o t a r y P u b T i c 
Res i d i n r, i n S n l r T.-»l-r» Tn« 
i . j . 
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FJAN^.'SISB' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FASHION PLACE INVESTMENT, LTD., 
a partnership, aka FASHION 
PLACE ASSOCIATES, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, HOLMES & ANDERSON, 
INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Consolidated Case No. 
C-84-302 
CRAIG DeHART, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLANC 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND' 
PLANNERS, et al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-84-3100 
STEVEN J. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, J & J ELECTRIC, et al. 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-84-3223 
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RONALD K. GEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, J & J ELECTRIC, et al. 
Defendants. 
THOMAS C. SORENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, J & J ELECTRIC, et al. 
Defendants. 
C i v i l No. C-84-3275 
C i v i l No. C-84-3355 
This m a t t e r i s be fo re t h e cour t on a Motion for Summary 
Judgment f i l e d by defendant Sal t Lake County/Salt Lake County 
Mental H e a l t h . A h e a r i n g on t h e Motion was h e l d on January 
5, 1987. Af te r o r a l argument the Court took the matter under 
advisement t o review t h e lengthy legal a u t h o r i t i e s submitted. 
The Court finds t h a t the re are genuine issues of mater ia l fac t 
concerning the i n t e n t of the p a r t i e s . Accordingly, defendant 's 
Motion for Summary Judgment i s denied. 
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FACTS 
This case is a subrogation action for property damage and 
business interruption brought by Safeco Insurance Company, in 
the name of its insureds, the owners of the building, against 
defendant Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County Mental Health, a 
tenant of the building. 
In 1978, the defendant entered into a lease with the plaintiffs, 
owners of the Fashion Place Professional Building, and began 
occupying a portion of the building. On May 1, 1983, a fire 
destroyed the building. Following the fire, Safeco Insurance 
Company, as insurer of the building for the owners, expended 
sums to rebuild the building and to compensate the owners for 
personal property losses and business interruption losses. 
Safeco Insurance Company then instituted this lawsuit, to recoup 
the losses sustained as a result of the alleged negligence of 
Salt Lake County. 
The issue presented to the Court is whether defendant Salt 
Lake County is a coinsured of the plaintiffs, and thus whether 
Safeco Insurance Co. is precluded from pursuing this subrogation 
action. 
1
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2
 I hereby certify that on June 2, 1988, four true and 
3 correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF were served on 
4
 each of the following by depositing same in the United States mail 
5
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8
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10
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11
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Clerk 
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DISCUSSION 
I, ABSENT AN EXPRESS AGREEMENT, A TENANT IS PRESUMED A COINSURED 
OF THE LANDLORD 
The rule is well established that an insurer cannot recover 
by means of subrogation against its own insured, or a coinsured 
under the policy. Board of Education v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246, 
1247 (Utah 1977) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Craftwall of Idaho, Inc.
 f 
757 F.2d 1030, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985); Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA 
Alaska Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Alaska 1981); 
Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478, 482 (Okla.App. 1975). Indeed, 
the Utah Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that "where 
an insurance company attempts to recover, as a subrogee, from 
a coinsured under a fire insurance policy, the action must fail 
in the absence of design or fraud on the part of the coinsured." 
Hales, 566 P.2d at 1247. 
Moreover, in cases where a landlord is obligated to provide 
fire insurance on the leased premises, the landlord is presumed 
to carry insurance for the tenant's benefit, and thus the tenant 
is presumed to be a coinsured, in the absence of an express 
agreement to the contrary. Alaska Ins. , 623 P.2d at 1218; Rizzuto 
v. Morris, 22 Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d 688, 690 (1979) (citing 
Rock Springs Realty, Inc. v. Waid, 392 S .W. 2d 270, 278 (Mo. 1965)); 
Monterey Corp. v. Hart, 216 Va. 843, 224 S.E.2d 142, 146 (1976); 
i^pp-i.J 
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II. AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
A. Provisions of Lease 
In recent years several courts have considered whether 
to deny a cause of action to landlords and the right of subrogation 
to their insurers when the landlord covenants to carry fire 
insurance on the leased premises and the fire damage is allegedly 
due to the negligence of the tenant. Aejbna Ins. Co. v. Craftwall 
of Idaho, Inc. , 757 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 198^) ; Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA 
Alaska Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981); Rizzuto 
v. Morris, 22 Wash.App, 951, 592 P.2d 688, 690 (1979); Sutton 
v. Jondahl. 532 P.2d 478 (Okla.App. 1975} • 
In Alaska Ins. , the most analogous case, the landlord's 
insurer brought an action against the insured's tenant for negligence 
in causing fire loss. In determining Whether to deny the cause 
of action, the Alaska Ins. court stated the controlling principle 
as follows: 
Absent an express provision) in t h e l e a s e 
e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e t e n a n t ' s l i a b i l i t y for 
l o s s from n e g l i g e n t l y s t a r t e d f i r e s , t h e 
t r e n d has been to find t ha t , t h e insurance 
obta ined was for the mutual lqenefit of both 
p a r t i e s , and t h a t t he tena|nt " s t a n d s in 
t h e shoes of the insured l and lo rd for the 
l i m i t e d purpose of defeat ing a subrogation 
c la im." 
Alaska I n s . , 623 P. 2d a t 1218 ( c i t a t i o n s omi t ted) (Emphasis 
added). 
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T h i s C o u r t a g r e e s w i t h t h e A l a s k a Supreme C o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t 
of t h e a p p l i c a b l e law, b u t a p p l i e s t h i s p r i n c i p l e d i f f e r e n t l y . 
The l e a s e a t i s s u e i n A l a s k a I n s , and t h e l e a s e p r o v i s i o n s 
i n t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h i s Cour t a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r . Both 
l e a s e s c o n t a i n a r e d e l i v e r y c l a u s e s t a t i n g t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g 
w o u l d b e r e t u r n e d i n good c o n d i t i o n , e x c e p t i n g f a i r wear and 
t e a r o r damage c a u s e d by f i r e , p r o v i d e d t h o s e damages d i d n o t 
a r i s e f rom t h e d i r e c t n e g l i g e n c e of t h e l e s s e e . 2 Both l e a s e s 
a l s o c o n t a i n an i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n a g r e e m e n t w h e r e b y t h e l e s s e e 
a g r e e d t o indemni fy and h o l d t h e l e s s o r h a r m l e s s from and a g a i n s t 
l o s s , d a m a g e and l i a b i l i t y a r i s i n g from t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t s of 
The r e d e l i v e r y p r o v i s i o n i n A l a s k a I n s . p r o v i d e s : 
I I . COVENANTS OF THE LESSEE: 
b . L e s s e e s h a l l u s e s a i d p r e m i s e s f o r l a w f u l b u s i n e s s 
p u r p o s e s and w i l l l e a v e s a i d p r e m i s e s a t 
t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f t h i s l e a s e i n a s g o o d 
a c o n d i t i o n a s r e c e i v e d , e x c e p t i n g f a i r 
w e a r and t e a r a n d / o r l o s s o r damage c a u s e d 
b y f i r e , e x p l o s i o n , e a r t h q u a k e o r o t h e r 
c a s u a l t y ; p r o v i d e d t h a t s u c h . c a s u a l t y was 
n o t caused by t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t of t h e L e s s e e , 
i t s employees o r a g e n t s . . . . 
A l a s k a I n s . , 623 P .2d a t 1 2 1 8 . The r e d e l i v e r y p r o v i s i o n 
i n t h i s c a s e p r o v i d e s : 
7 . At t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e t e r m of t h i s 
l e a s e , LESSEE w i l l y i e l d a n d d e l i v e r up 
t h e PREMISES t o LESSOR i n a s g o o d o r d e r 
a n d c o n d i t i o n a s when e n t e r e d upon by t h e 
LESSEE, r e a s o n a b l e u s e a n d w e a r t h e r e o f , 
damage by f i r e and c a s u a l t y n o t t h e f a u l t 
o f LESSEE and damage b y e l e m e n t s e x c e p t e d 
t h e r e f r o m . 
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the lessee,3 Additionally, both le^se agreements contain a 
provision that the landlord would obtain and keep in force a 
policy of insurance to cover loss by fire.4 
The indemnification provision in Alaska Ins. states: 
II, COVENANTS OF THE LESSEE: 
c. Lessee agrees to indemnify and hold Lessor harmless 
from and against loss, damage and liability 
arising from the negligent act of Lessee, 
its agents, employees, or clients; 
Id. at 1218. Similarly, the indemnification provision 
in this case states: 
16(a) LESSEE shall indemnify and save 
LESSOR harmless from all loss, d&mage, liability, 
or expense incurred by LESSOR due to the 
exclusive negligent acts or omissions to 
act of LESSEE, its officers, employees, 
or agents arising out of LESSEE'S use or 
operation of the PREMISES and shall not 
permit any lien or other c|laim or demand 
to be enforced against the PREMISES by reason 
of LESSEE'S, use of the PREMISES. 
The insurance clause in Alaska Ins p r o v i d e s : 
I I I . MUTUAL COVENANTS OF LESSOR AND LESSEE: 
c . L e s s o r a g r e e s t o p a y a l l t ^ x e s and a s s e s s m e n t s made 
a g a i n s t a n d l e v i e d u p o n ^ a i d p r o p e r t y . 
L e s s o r s h a l l o b t a i n and k e e p i n f o r c e d u r i n g 
t h e ~term of " t h i s l e a s e a p o l i c y o r p o l i c i e s 
o f i n s u r a n c e c o v e r i n g l o s s o r d a m a g e s t o 
t h e p r e m i s e s p r o v i d i n g p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 
a l l p e r i l s and r i s k s i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d 
t o t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o f I f i r e , e x t e n d e d 
c o v e r a g e , vanda l i sm and mal ic iou^ mischief . . . . 
I d . a t 1 2 1 9 . The i n s u r a n c e c l a u s e i n t h e c a s e a t 
b a r p r o v i d e s : 
9 , R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r u t i l i t i e s , t a x e s , 
and i n s u r a n c e s h a l l b e a s i n d i c a t e d : 
P o w e r (L)", H e a t (L) , | 7 a t e r (L) , 
S e w e r (L) , T e l e p h o n e (T) , R e a l 
P r o p e r t y T a x (L) , I n l c r e a s e i n 
Rea l P r o p e r t y Tax (L) , Fir le I n s u r a n c e 
on B u i l d i n g ( L ) , F i r e I n s u r a n c e 
on P e r s o n a l P r o p e r t y ^ L ) , G l a s s 
I n s u r a n c e ( L ) . 
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I n A l a s k a I n s . , t h e c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t , f t h e r e d e l i v e r y 
a n d i n d e m n i t y p r o v i s i o n s r e l i e d upon b y AIC [ i n s u r e r ] , when 
r e a d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e i n s u r a n c e c l a u s e of I I I . c , f a i l 
t o c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h RCA's [ t e n a n t ' s ] l i a b i l i t y f o r f i r e damage 
c a u s e d by i t s own n e g l i g e n c e . " A l a s k a I n s . , 623 P . 2d a t 1219 . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e A l a s k a c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e i n s u r e r c o u l d n o t 
e x e r c i s e t h e r i g h t of s u b r o g a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e t e n a n t t o r e c o v e r 
f o r t h e n e g l i g e n c e and a f f i r m e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s g r a n t of summary 
j u d g m e n t a s t o t h i s i s s u e . I d . a t 1220 . 
C o n t r a r y t o t h e p o s i t i o n t a k e n by t h e m a j o r i t y i n i n t e r p r e t i n g 
t h e r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of t h e l e a s e a t i s s u e i n A l a s k a I n s . , 5 
t h i s Court f i n d s t h e s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s of t h e l e a s e a t bar 
t o be in c o n f l i c t . In considering the r ede l i ve ry and indemnity 
p rov i s ions in conjunction with the insurance c l ause , the Court 
Chief J u s t i c e Rabinowitz, d i s sen t ing , found t h a t the 
p a r t i e s did include an express provision in the l ease 
e s t a b l i s h i n g l i a b i l i t y on the tenant for f i r e s caused 
by t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t s of t h e t e n a n t . The d i s s e n t 
f u r t h e r no t ed , however, tha t if the l ease provis ions 
were found i n c o n s i s t e n t , such would l e a v e genuine 
i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l fact concerning the i n t e n t of the 
p a r t i e s and summary judgment would be inapprop r i a t e . 
Alaska I n s . , 623 P.2d a t 1220. 
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f i n d s t h e r e i s an a m b i g u i t y i n t h e l e a s e . The l a n d l o r d d i d 
l o t s p e c i f i c a l l y and e x p r e s s l y r e s e r v e i t s i n s u r e r ' s r i g h t s 
bo s u b r o g a t e a g a i n s t i t s t e n a n t f o r f i r e s n e g l i g e n t l y c a u s e d , 
Absent s u c h an e x p r e s s ag reemen t , t h e Couf t i s u n a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e 
f rom t h e l e a s e i t s e l f what t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , 
i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o l o o k beyond t h e f o u r c o r n e r s of t h e l e a s e 
and c o n s i d e r e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e a s t o vfho t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d 
t o b e a r t h e b u r d e n of l o s s i n t h e c a s e o^ a f i r e a l l e g e d l y c a u s e d 
by a n e g l i g e n t t e n a n t , b u t c o v e r e d by t}ie l a n d l o r d ' s i n s u r a n c e . 
Utah V a l l e y Bank v . T a n n e r , 636 P .2d 1060| (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) . 
B. I n t e n t of P a r t i e s 
T h e C o u r t ' s r e v i e w of t h e c a s e s i n t h i s a r e a l e a d s h e r 
t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s i s t h e p r i m a r y f a c t o r 
c o n s i d e r e d by t h e c o u r t s i n c o n s t r u i n g e x e m p t i o n p r o v i s i o n s 
o f t h e p a r t i e s ' l e a s e . R i z z u t o v . M o | r r i s , 22 Wash.App. 9 5 1 , 
592 P . 2 d 6 8 8 , 691 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; s ee a l s o , Alask|a I n s . Co. v . RCA Alaska 
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , I n c . , 623 P .2d 1216 , 1220 ( A l a s k a 1981) ( R a b i n o w i t z , 
C . J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) . The f a c t s t h u s f a r d e v e l o p e d a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t 
t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e Cour t 
d e n i e s d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion f o r Summary J u d g m e n t . I n an e f f o r t , 
h o w e v e r , t o a i d t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e f a c t s 
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regarding the intent of the parties, the Court notes several 
factors considered by the Rizzuto court which this Court finds 
persuasive. 
In Rizzuto, lessors brought an action against the lessee 
for losses allegedly sustained due to the destruction of a building 
in a fire caused by the negligence of the lessee's employee. 
The Washington Court of Appeals determined that the lessee was 
not liable for the fire damage, and the insurance company had 
no right of subrogation, based upon the undisupted testimony 
of the parties at trial regarding their intentions. Id. , 22 
Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d at 691. The factors considered by the 
Rizzuto court in determining the intent of the parties include: 
1. Whether the lessors had taken the responsibility of 
insuring the leased building in an adequate amount against the 
risk of fire; 
2. If so, whether the lessee was aware of this action; 
3. Whether the lessee understood the lease to exempt 
it from liability for all fires including those of negligent 
origin; 
4. Whether the lessor adjusted its rental rate upward 
to compensate for the fire insurance coverage. Id. , 22 Wash. 
App. 951, 592 P.2d at 690. 
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CONCLUSION 
T h e C o u r t e m p h a s i z e s t h a t s h e a g r e e s w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t 
of p o l i c y a s summarized by Kee ton , I n s u r a n c e Law, S e c t i o n 4 . 4 ( b ) 
a t 210 ( 1 9 7 1 ) : 
P r o b a b l y i t i s u n d e s i r a b l e , from t h e p o i n t 
o f v i e w of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , ) t h a t t h e r i s k 
of l o s s f rom a f i r e n e g l i g e n t l y c a u s e d by 
*a l e s s e e b e u p o n t h e l e s s e e r a t h e r t h a n 
t h e l e s s o r ' s i n s u r e r . Al lowing t h e l e s s o r ' s 
i n s u r e r t o p r o c e e d a g a i n s t t h e l e s s e e i s 
s u r e l y c o n t r a r y t o e x p e c t a t i o n s of p e r s o n s 
o t h e r t h a n t h o s e who h a v e bjeen e x p o s e d t o 
t h i s b i t o f l aw e i t h e r d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s 
f o r a l e a s e o r e l s e a f t e r a l o s s . . • . 
[ P j e r h a p s [ t h e c o u r t s ] s h o u l d a t l e a s e a d o p t 
a r u l e a g a i n s t a l l o w i n g t h e l e s s o r ' s i n s u r e r 
t o p r o c e e d a g a i n s t t h e l e s s e e when l e a s e 
p r o v i s i o n s a r e a m b i g u o u s i n t h i s r e g a r d 
and t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i s s i l e n t o r a m b i g u o u s . 
The C o u r t n o t e s t h a t , a b s e n t an e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n i n t h e l e a s e 
t o t h e c o n t r a r y / t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e l e s s e e i s a c o i n s u r e d 
of t h e l e s s o r , t h u s b a r r i n g a s u b r o g a t i o n a c t i o n by t h e i n s u r e r 
a g a i n s t i t s own i n s u r e d . The C o u r t a l s o b e l i e v e s , h o w e v e r , 
t h a t t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e l e a s e s h o u l d be a b l e t o c o n t r a c t a r o u n d 
s u c h a p r e s u m p t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e , i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s 
a t t e m p t e d t o do j u s t t h a t . 6 However, i n t h e C o u r t ' s v i e w t h e 
T h e C o u r t n o t e s t h a t t h e l e a s e a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e 
i s n o t a n a d h e s i o n c o n t r a c t ; r a t h e r , i t was p r e p a r e d 
and d r a f t e d by a t t o r n e y s f o r S a l t Lake Coun ty . P l a i n t i f f s * 
Memorandum i n O p p o s i t i o n , a t p . 1 8 . 
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provisions drafted are ambiguous. Accordingly, extrinsic evidence 
as to the parties1 intentions must be considered and defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Dated this 14th day of January, 1987. 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS (1 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FASHION PLACE INVESTMENT, LTD., 
a partnership, aka FASHION 
PLACE ASSOCIATES, FASHION PLACE 
INVESTORS LTD., a limited 
partnership, CAPITOL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, VALLEY 
MORTGAGE COMPANY, DR. ROBERT 
ANDERSON, DR. BARLOW L. PACKER, 
DR. ORLANDO T. BARROWES, DR. 
CARLSON TERRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, HOLMES & ANDERSON, 
INC., J&J ELECTRIC, DICK'S 
PLUMBING, THOMPSON & SONS 
HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, 
ECKMAN &. MIDGLEY CONTRACTORS, 
THORNTON PLUMBING & HEATING, 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10, JANE 
DOES 1 THROUGH 5, JOHN DOES 1 
THROUGH 5, AIR CARE INDUSTRIES, 
INC., an Illinois corporation, 
RULE 52 STATEMENT 
ON DECISION 
Consolidated 
Civil No. C84-302 
Judge: David Young 
(Captions for Consolidated. 
Cases C84-3100; 3223; 
and 3275 not shown) 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, et al., 
Third-Party
 4 
Plaintiffs,' 
vs. 
RICHARD HARMAN, dba BUILDING 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES and SAFECO 
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.# 
Third-Party 
Defendants• 
The Court, pursuant to Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby issues a brief written statement of 
the grounds upon which its decision was reached granting Salt 
Lake County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing 
the subrogation claims of Safeco Insurance Company, which 
Motion was argued, pursuant to proper notice, before the Court 
on September 8, 1987, at the hour of 8:30 a.m., with the 
plaintiffs Eashion Place Investment, Ltd., a partnership, aka 
Fashion Place Associates, Capitol-Life Insurance Company, 
Valley Mortgage Company, Dr. Robert Anderson, Dr. Barlow L. 
Packart, Dr. Orlando T. Barrowes, and Dr. Carlson Terry 
being represented by Theodore E. Kanell and John 
Braithwaite, and the plaintiff Fashion Place Investors, Ltd,, 
being represented by Theordore E. Kanell, John 
Braithwaite and David Olsen; the defendant Salt Lake 
County/Salt Lake County Mental Health being represented by Gary 
B. Ferguson, Gary L. Johnson and William H. Hyde; and the 
defendant Air Care Industries, Inc., being represented by 
Wallace R. Lauchnor. After hearing oral argument, and 
2 
reviewing the pleadings on file, the Co^rt granted Salt Lake 
County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing tha 
subrogation claims of Safeco Insurance Company. The Court's 
Order was based upon the testimony listed in depositions cited 
during oral argument and in memoranda supporting the Motions 
for Summary Judgment, the law of the ca$e as determined by 
Judge Judith L. Billings, and the law cilted by counsel for Salt 
Lake County in their Brief in support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
The Court notes that, with thq exception of certain 
uninsured loss, the above action is a si^brogation action filed 
by Safeco Insurance Company in the name$ of its insureds. By 
earlier Memorandum Decision, Judge Judith L. Billings 
determined that Salt Lake County was prdsumed to be a 
co-insured of the lessors, and therefor© an insured of 
Safeco Insurance Company, thus barring Subrogation claims of 
Safeco Insurance Company, against Salt I^ ake County which 
subrogation claims arose out of the May 1, 1983 fire. Judge 
Billings further found that this presumption could be overcome 
by an express showing in the Lease that Salt Lake County was 
not to be a co-insured of the lessors. Judge Billings 
concluded: 
The court also believes, however, that the 
parties of the Lease should bd able to 
contract around such a presumption. In 
this case, it appears that th^ parties 
attempted to do just that. [footnote 
omitted.] However, in the Court's view, 
the provisions drafted are ambiguous. 
Accordingly, extrinsic evidence as to the 
parties1 intentions must be considered and 
3 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
Memorandum Decision Judith M. Billings, District Court Judge, 
dated January 14, 1987. Consolidated Case No. C-84-302. 
By Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, both the 
plaintiffs and Salt Lake County argue that the depositions and 
discovery conducted after Judge Billings1 January 14, 1987 
Memorandum Decision supply the extrinsic evidence as to the 
parties1 intentions such that the Court now can decide, as a 
matter of law, whether or not there was expressed intent on the 
part of the parties to overcome the presumption that Salt Lake 
County was a co-insured with the lessor. Both parties filed 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment representing that there 
were no genuine issues as to material facts from which, the 
intent of the parties could be determined. During oral 
argument, no genuine issue as to any material fact was ever 
raised by either party. The Court found none to exist* 
In reaching the above decision the Court adopted 
Judge Billings1 Memorandum Decision dated January* 14, 1987 as 
the law of the case. The only issue remaining to be determined 
by the Court on the issue of whether Salt Lake County was a 
co-insured was whether or not "extrinsic evidence as to the 
parties1 intentions" established an express intent to waive 
Salt Lake County's protection from subrogation by Safeco. 
The Court specifically adopts and applies Judge Bilings1 
conclusion that: 
The Court notes that, absent an express 
provision in the lease to the contrary, the 
presumption is that the lessee is a 
4 
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co-insured of a lessor, thus barring a 
subrogation action by the insurer against 
its own insured. 
Memorandum Decision. 
The Court basis its Order granting Salt Lake County's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that the 
undisputed material facts establish that there was no expressed 
intent on the part of the parties to the Lease to reserve to 
Safeco Insurance Company the right to subrogate against Salt 
Lake County. Therefore, Salt Lake County is presumed to be a 
co-insured of Safeco, thereby barring any subrogation by 
Safeco against Salt Lake County for any claims paid by 
Safeco as a result of the May 1, 1983. 
Further, the Court basis its decision granting Salt 
Lake County's' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
Court's determination that, as a matter tof law, paragraphs 9 
and 19 of the March 1, 1981 Lease are pre-loss releases by 
the lessors of any subrogation claims th^ Lt Safeco may have as 
a result of the May 1, 1983 fire. The C|ourt specifically notes 
that Judge Billings did not rule on this issue of pre-loss 
release. 
DATED this (XT day of September, 1987 V 
JY^THE COURT: 
\ 
The H o n o r a b l e pavad S. Young 
T h i r d D i s t r i c t / Cckrct J u d g e 
By v— TtyZXl^ 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was hand delivered on this )W*7^ H day of 
September, 1387, to the following counsel of record. This 
service is made pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of Practice in the 
Third District Court of the State of Utah. The original of 
this Order sfrall be presented to the CoMrt five {5) d^Ys ^£ter 
the date of service upon opposing counsel. 
Ralph D. Crockett 
peputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants Salt Lake 
County/Salt Lake County Mental Health 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
pavid R. Olsen 
Craig W. Anderson 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Fashion Place 
Investors, Ltd. 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Theodore E. Kanell 
John N. Sraithwaite 
KANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Fashion Place 
Investors, Ltd. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney for Safeco Insurance 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Attorney for Defendant Air Care Industries 
CSB Tower 500, 50 South. *te.ixv 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD -JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FASHION PLACE INVESTMENT, LTD., 
a partnership, aka FASHION 
PLACE ASSOCIATES, FASHION PLACE 
INVESTORS LTD., a limited 
partnership, CAPITOL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, VALLEY 
MORTGAGE COMPANY, DR. ROBERT 
ANDERSON, DR. BARLOW L. PACKER, 
DR. ORLANDO T. BARROWES, DR. 
CARLSON TERRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL.HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER,; ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, HOLMES & ANDERSON, 
INC., J&J ELECTRIC, DICK'S 
PLUMBING, THOMPSON & SONS 
HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, 
ECKMAN & MIDGLEY CONTRACTORS, 
THORNTON PLUMBING 6 HEATING, 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10, JANE 
DOES 1 THROUGH 5, JOHN DOES 1 
THROUGH 5, AIR CARE INDUSTRIES, 
INC., an Illinois corporation, 
ORDER 
GRANTING SALT LAKE COUNTY'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Consolidated 
Civil No. C84-302 
Judge David Young 
(Captions for Consolidated 
cases C84-3100; 3223; 
apd 3275 not shown) 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE: COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, et aL. , 
Third-Party : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
RICHARD HARMAN, dba BUILDING 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES and SAFECO : 
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., : 
Third-Party : 
Defendants. : 
Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County Mental Health's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the subrogation 
claims of Safeco Insurance Company from the above-entitled 
action having come on before the Court September 8, 1987, at 
the hour of 8:30 a.m., pursuant to notice properly given, with 
Gary B. Ferguson, Gary L. Johnson and William H. Hyde 
representing Salt Lake County; Theodore E. Kanell, and John 
N. Braithwaite, David Olsen representing the plaintiffs; 
David Olsen representing the plaintiff Fashion Place 
Investors, Ltd.; and Wallace R. Lauchnor representing Air 
Care Industries, and upon hearing oral argument, and after 
being fully advised in the premises, the Court 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES that Salt Lake County's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing all subrogation 
claims of Safeco Insurance Company against Salt Lake County 
is granted. The Court expressly determines pursuant to Rule 
54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that there is no just 
reason for delay in entry of this Order as final judgment, and 
therefore hereby orders that this Order and Judgment is final, 
2 
entered forthwith dismissing with prejudice, the subrogation 
claims of Safeco Insurance Company against the defendant Salt 
Lake County. Salt Lake County is awarded those costs which the 
Court feels to be appropriate upon submission, timely, of a 
proper memorandum of costs and disbursements . 
DATED this ^^^day of September, 1987. 
BY THE CQURT: 
ATTEST X -v 
n D ~-r~* V <$i£^ 
By CJ-.y fi^\ /x.v . _. TheT Honorable David $. Young 
D^ utyDck Third District Court) Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was hand delivered on this |cfrH day of 
September, 1987, to the following counsel of recora. This 
service is made pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of Practice in the 
Third District Court of the State of Utah. The original of 
this Judgment shall be presented to the Court five (5) days 
after the date of service upon opposing counsel • 
Ralph D. Crockett 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants Salt Lake 
County/Salt Lake County Mental Health 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David R. Olsen 
Craig W. Anderson 
STUTTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG S HANSON 
Attorneys for Fashion Place 
Investors, Ltd. 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Theodore E. Kanell 
John N. Braithwaite 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITfH 
Attorneys for Fashion Place 
Investors, Ltd. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84101 
3 
z 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney-
 4for Safeco Insurance 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Attorney for Defendant Air Care Industries 
CSB Tower 500, 50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TASHION PLACE INVESTMENT, LTD., 
i partnership, aka FASHION 
PLACE ASSOCIATES, FASHION PLACE 
(INVESTORS LTD., a limited 
aartnership, CAPITOL LIFE 
CNSURANCE COMPANY, VALLEY 
MORTGAGE COMPANY, DR. ROBERT 
UTDERSON, DR. BARLOW L. PACKER, 
DR. ORLANDO T. BARROWES, DR. 
ZARLSON TERRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, HOLMES & ANDERSON, 
INC., J&J ELECTRIC, DICK'S 
PLUMBING, THOMPSON & SONS 
HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, 
ECKMAN & MIDGLEY CONTRACTORS, 
THORNTON PLUMBING & HEATING, 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10, JANE 
DOES 1 THROUGH 5, JOHN DOES 1 
THROUGH 5, AIR CARE INDUSTRIES, 
INC., an Illinois corporation, 
JUDGMENT 
Consolidated. 
Civil No.- C84-302 
Judge David Young. 
(Captions for Consolidated 
Cases -C34-3-100; 3223; 
and 3275 not shown) 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE : 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, et al. , : 
Third-Party : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
RICHARD HARMAN, dba BUILDING : 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES and SAFECO : 
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., : 
Third-Party : 
Defendants, : 
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Salt Lake 
County and against the plaintiffs in the above-entitled action 
Fashion Place Investment, Ltd,, aka Fashion Place Associates, 
Fashion Place Investors, Ltd., Capitol Life Insurance Company 
Valley Mortgage Company, Dr. Robert Anderson, Dr. Barlow L. 
Packer, Dr. Orlando T. Barrowes, Dr. Carlston Terry, for 
no cause of action, on the subrogation claims of Safeco 
Insurance Company. This Judgment is entered pursuant to the 
Courtfs Order granting Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County Mental 
Health's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the 
plaintiffs1 action .against Salt Lake County to the extent that 
the action is basejd upon claims paid by Safeco Insurance 
Company on the May 1, 1983 fire at .the Fashion Place 
Professional Building and sought in the above-entitled action 
as a matter of subrogation. 
This is a final Judgment pursuant to the provisions 
of Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant 
Salt Lake County is awarded its costs incurred in defending the 
2 
subrogation claims asserted by Safeco Insurance Company in 
the above-entitled matter• 
DATED this jV^day of September, 1987. 
JY. THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DVACX KmCATf 
,r\ [) ~f- The Honorable IDavid S. Young 
By C T cVC(x^^ Third District^ CoWt Judge 
0*£Uy Cork 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was hand delivered on this \M-H\ day of 
September, 1987, to the following counsel of record. This 
service is made pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of Practice in the 
Third District Court of the State of Utah. The original of 
this Order shall be presented to the Court five (5) days after 
the date of service upon opposing counsel. 
Ralph D. Crockett 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attoifney 
Attorney .for Defendants Salt Lake 
County/Salt Lake County Mental Health 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David R. Olsen 
Craig W. Anderson 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Fashion Place 
Investors, Ltd. 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Theodore E. Kanell 
John N. Braithwaite 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Fashion Place 
Investors, Ltd. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
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Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney for Safeco Insurance 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Wallace R„ Lauchnor 
Attorney for Defendant Air Care Industries 
CSB Tower 500, 50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
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